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Abstract. We study a simple, solvable model that allows us to investigate effects
of credit contagion on the default probability of individual firms, in both portfolios of
firms and on an economy wide scale. While the effect of interactions may be small in
typical (most probable) scenarios they are magnified, due to feedback, by situations
of economic stress, which in turn leads to fatter tails in loss distributions of large loan
portfolios.
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1. Introduction
Modelling credit risk in a coherent yet applicable manner is an important yet challenging
problem. The difficulties arise from the combination of a large, and co-dependent set of
risk parameters such as default rates, recovery rates, or exposures, which are correlated
and non-stationary in time. An additional issue is that of credit contagion [1, 2, 4],
which examines the role of counter-party risk in credit risk modelling. If a firm is in
economic distress, or defaults, this will implications for any firm which is economically
influenced by this given firm, for example, a service provider to it, purchaser of its goods
or a bank with a credit line to the firm. The direct correlations between firms caused by
credit contagion lead to further complications in modelling the overall, either portfolio
or economy wide, level of risk. Jarrow and Yu [1] introduced a framework of primary
and secondary firms, the former would default depending on some background stochastic
process while the latter were affected by a stochastic process and the performance of
the primary firms. They argued that this was a reasonable level of detail for their
purposes and it also simplifies matters as there are no feedback loops in the system.
Secondary firms depend only on primary firms whose performance is independent of
the secondary firms. Another approach for modelling credit contagion dynamics was
provided by Giesecke and Weber [2] who used the well known voter process [3], from
the theory of interacting particle systems, to model interactions between firms. They
assumed a regular structure for their firms (a regular hyper-cubic lattice) and focussed
on the equilibrium properties of their model. Davis and Lo [4] considered a model in
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which defaults occur either directly, or through infection by another defaulted firm,
with probabilities for direct default or infection taken uniform throughout the system.
Defaults occurring due to both, endogenous or exogenous causes were not considered in
their set-up.
There are a variety of techniques for modelling the correlations between firms’
default behaviour, which is a major complication in credit risk modelling. The binomial
expansion technique assumes independence between firms so that the number of defaults
in a portfolio is described by a binomial distribution. In order to capture the effects
of correlations a binomial distribution with an “effective” number of firms is assumed
which is smaller than the actual number in the portfolio, but the weight given to
each firm scaled so as to keep the mean number of defaults constant, while the
variance of the overall number of defaults is increased. The relationship between
the true number of firms and the effective reduced number is a modelling choice that
depends on the diversity of the firms in terms of sectors, geographic locations or any
other identifiable trait that would lead to strong correlations in default behaviour.
JP Morgans’ CreditMetrics approach [5] and Credit Suisse First Financial Products
CreditRisk+ [6] (see [7] for a detailed comparison between the two) uses the correlations
in equity values as a surrogate for the correlations in credit quality. The structural
modelling approach goes back a long way to work by Merton [8] which directly models
the dynamics of a firm’s assets, with default being triggered by the asset value hitting
some predetermined value (which henceforth we take without loss of generality to be
zero). Correlations between firms are due to correlations in the dynamics of different
firms’ assets. This approach is very general, as it is relatively transparent to identify
different driving forces of asset levels and straightforward to include them in the model
(though the resulting model itself will be non-trivial). However, it suffers from the fact
that the asset level is not an observable quantity [9]. On the other hand, the reduced
form approach gives default rates for a given firm without modelling the underlying
default process. Correlations are then directly introduced between the default rates.
There was some discussion in the literature about whether the reduced form model
could describe the true level of default correlations seen empirically but Yu [10] seems
to have answered this question in the affirmative if a suitable structure between the
default rates is taken into account.
The approach we take here is a discrete time Markov process (at the microeconomic
level) where the probability of a default of a given firm in a particular time step depends
materially on the state of its economic partners at the start of that time step, as
well as on macro-economic influences. Using techniques developed in the statistical
mechanics of disordered systems, and recently applied to this specific model in [11],
we are able to solve our model exactly, and given our assumptions that we describe
shortly, this solution takes a particularly simple form despite the fact that in principle we
have feedback correlations, non-equilibrium dynamics and in principle non-Markovian
behaviour at the macroscopic (economy/portfolio wide) level. We note that it is possible
to frame our model in either the structural approach or the reduced form approach,
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depending on requirements and taste, although the interpretation of the variables in
the two approaches will of course be different. We find that the correlations introduced
through credit contagion lead to large increases in default rates in times of economic
stress, above and beyond those introduced by simple macro-economic dependencies.
This has strong implications for portfolio risk management.
2. The microeconomic framework
We will analyse an economy of N firms in the large N limit. Generally, we focus on the
characteristic changes in the economy due to interactions between firms, which will be
described in a probabilistic manner.
As mentioned in the introduction we take a discrete time approach. For clarity
we restrict our discussion to a one year time frame split into twelve steps; this is not
essential, but parameters may need rescaling depending on the set-up. We use a binary
indicator variable ni,t to denote whether firm i is solvent at time t (ni,t = 0) or has
defaulted (ni,t = 1). The default process is a function of an underlying stochastic
process for each firm in terms of a “wealth” variable Wi,t, where we assume default if
the wealth drops below zero. We shall assume that recovery from default over the time
horizon of a year is not possible, so that the defaulted state is absorbing. As a function
of the wealth, therefore, the indicator variables evolve according to
ni,t+1 = ni,t + (1− ni,t)Θ(−Wi,t) , (1)
where Θ(. . .) is the Heavyside function.
A dynamic model for the indicator variables is obtained from (1) by specifying the
underlying stochastic process for the wealth variables Wi,t. We shall take it to be of the
form
Wi,t = ϑi −
N∑
j=1
Jijnj,t − ηi,t . (2)
Here ϑi denotes an initial wealth of firm i at the beginning of the risk horizon, and Jij
quantifies the material impact on the wealth of firm i that would be caused by a default
of firm j. This may or may not be a reduction in wealth, depending on whether j has
a cooperative (Jij > 0) or a competitive (Jij < 0) economic relation with i.
We shall assume that the fluctuating contributions ηi,t to (2) are zero-mean
Gaussians. There is still some degree of flexibility concerning the decomposition of
the ηi,t into contributions that are intrinsic to the firm and extrinsic contributions. The
latter describe the influence of economy-wide fluctuations or fluctuations pertaining
to different economic sectors, depending on the level of detail required. We restrict
ourselves to a minimal model containing a single macro-economic factor (assumed to be
constant over a risk horizon of a year), and individual fluctuations for each firm,
ηi,t = σi
(√
ρiη0 +
√
1− ρi ξi,t
)
, (3)
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where σi sets the scale of the individual fluctuations, and the {ξi,t} are taken to be
independent N (0, 1) Gaussians; finally, the parameters ρi quantify the correlations of the
ηi,t created via the coupling to economy-wide fluctuations η0, also taken to be N (0, 1).
Up to this point the wealth dynamics does not contain an endogenous drift. If
predictions are required over longer time periods then it may also be pertinent to
introduce such a drift, e.g. by using a time-dependent ϑi for example, ϑi,t = ϑi(0)e
zit,
where zi denotes an intrinsic growth rate of the average wealth of firm i (with zi > 0
for a firm making profits and zi < 0 for a firm making losses). However, for the current
purposes of examining default rates over the medium term and especially focussing on
the behaviour on the tails, this adjustment does not lead to significant changes in our
overall conclusion.
The model, as formulated above, clearly takes a structural point of view on
the problem of credit contagion. However, we note that the dynamics (1) of the
indicator variables is clearly independent of the scale of the wealth variables Wi,t. By
appropriately rescaling the initial wealths ϑi and the impact parameters Jij we can
thus assume a unit-scale σi ≡ 1 for the noise variables (3). Interestingly, this simple
rescaling, which leaves the dynamics of the system unaffected, amounts to changing to
a reduced-form interpretation of the dynamics.
To see this, note from (2) that the event Wi,t < 0 is equivalent to ηi,t >
ϑi−∑Nj=1 Jijnj,t. With σi ≡ 1, we see that this occurs with probability Φ(∑j Jijnj,t−ϑi)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution. From a reduced form point of view this
is just the intensity of default of firm i at time step t (in a given economic environment
specified by the set of firms defaulted at time t). This allows us to re-interpret the
(rescaled) initial wealth and impact variables ϑi and Jij in terms of the bare default
probabilities [11, 12, 13]. I.e., if company i has an expected default probability of pi in
a given time unit (e.g. one month in the present set-up) as predicted from tables from
ratings agencies, then ϑi = −Φ−1(pi). Similarly, the expected default probability pi|j of
firm i, given that only firm j has defaulted leads to the value Jij = Φ
−1(pi|j)−Φ−1(pi).
In determining the model parameters by the method suggested above we are
splitting our default probability into terms that come from credit contagion and other
terms such as the bare default probability that come from historical data. It could
fairly be argued that the historical data already incorporate the credit contagion terms
and thus we are double counting. As we will see later in numerical simulations, the
credit contagion terms make very little difference to average behaviour and thus making
estimates based on average historical data is still a reasonable approach.
In choosing the variable ρi we follow the prescription given by BASEL II [14] which
sets
ρi = 0.12
1− e−50PDi
1− e−50 + 0.24
(
1− 1− e
−50PDi
1− e−50
)
≈ 0.12
(
1 + e−50PDi
)
(4)
where PDi gives the probability of default of firm i over one year, ignoring credit
contagion effects. With pi = Φ(−ϑi) as the monthly default probability, we have
PDi ≈ 12Φ(−ϑi).
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We still have to specify the form for the economic interactions. We adopt here a
probabilistic approach, so take them to be random quantities of the form
Jij = cij
[
J0
c
+
J√
c
xij
]
. (5)
Here, the cij ∈ {0, 1} detail the network (presence or absence) of interactions between
different firms and we choose these to be randomly fixed according to
P (cij) =
c
N
δcij ,1 +
(
1− c
N
)
δcij ,0 , i < j , cji = cij . (6)
We assume that the average connectivity c of each firm is large in the limit of a large
economy; this will allow the influence of partner firms to be described by the central
limit theorem and the law of large numbers. Concerning the values of the (non-zero)
impact parameters, we parametrise them as shown, with xij assumed to be zero-mean,
unit-variance random variables, with finite moments, and independent in pairs,
xij = 0 , x2ij = 1 , xijxji = α , xijxkl = 0 otherwise . (7)
The parameters J0 and J determine mean and variance of the interaction strengths; the
scaling of mean and variance with c and
√
c respectively in (5) is necessary to allow
a meaningful large c limit to be taken. Taking J0 > 0 would encode the fact that on
average firms have a synergy with their economic partners.
At first sight, specifying the Jij appears to introduce a vast number of parameters
into our model, but in fact only the first two moments of the distribution of interaction
strengths are sufficient to determine the macroscopic behaviour of the system, and so
the model space is not too large.
Let us now turn to the capital required to be held against credit risk. In the BASEL
II document [14] the capital requirement for a unit-size loan given to firm i is
Ki = LGDi
[
Φ
(√
ρiΦ
−1(0.999) + Φ−1(PDi)√
1− ρi
)
− PDi
]
Mi . (8)
The first factor, the loss given default LGDi of firm i, is related to the average fraction
of a loan that can be recovered despite default. The last factor, Mi, is related to the
maturity (long dated loans are inherently riskier). Adjustments related to liquidity (low
liquidity loans are risker) and concentration (fewer, larger loans give a greater variance
in returns for given expected return) are occasionally also included in this factor —
concentration-adjustments, in fact, are a means to account for reduced granularity in a
credit portfolio resulting from the possibility of credit contagion.
The factor inside square brackets in (8) is entirely related to the loss-frequency
distribution. The first term is the value of the loss frequency not exceeded with
probability q = 0.999 under fluctuating macro-economic conditions, with ρi describing
the dependence of the firm’s loss-frequency on the macro-economic factor. The second
term is the average loss frequency. The value of the confidence level q is in principle
arbitrary, but is related to the target rating of the bank. The risk weighted asset is
then found by further multiplying by terms such as the exposure at default (i.e. size of
the loan). Thus the capital required for firm i can be viewed as the loss at the 99.9th
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percentile level of stress, in excess of the expected loss, multiplied by a conversion
factor. From this structure it is clear that a key ingredient for the capital adequacy
requirements is a good model of credit risk that works well into the tail of the loss
frequency distribution.
Returning to our description of default dynamics, let us first focus on the case of
independent firms, with Jij = 0 ∀i, j, and consider a single epoch for our model with
fluctuating forces given by (3) at given macro-economic condition η0. The probability of
a default of firm i with average unconditional monthly default probability pi occurring
during the epoch t→ t + 1 in our model is given by
〈ni,t+1|ni,t = 0〉 = Φ
(√
ρi η0 + Φ
−1(pi)√
1− ρi
)
(9)
Since the probability of default is increasing with η0, we can find the probability of
default not exceeded at e.g. the 99.9 percent confidence level; it is given by setting
η0 = Φ
−1(0.999) in the above equation (recall η0 is distributed as a zero-mean, unit-
variance Gaussian random number). As above, the excess capital required is the loss at
the 99.9th percent level minus the expected loss (multiplied by a risk factor). However,
when we consider the case of an interacting economy with non-zero Jij, we find that in
fact
〈ni,t+1|ni,t = 0〉 = Φ
(
J0mt +
√
ρi η0 − ϑi√
1− ρi + J2mt
)
, (10)
where
mt =
1
N
∑
j
nj,t (11)
is the fraction of firms within the economy that have defaulted up to time t; we also
expressed the expected monthly default rate pi in terms of a ‘rescaled initial wealth’ ϑi,
Φ−1(pi) = −ϑi.
Thus we find that our formulation is very similar to that used in BASEL II. However,
we directly take account of the correlations in defaults caused by credit contagion.
This introduces two extra parameters into the model but it does markedly change the
behaviour in the tails of the loss frequency distribution, and thereby in the tails of the
loss distribution itself. Correlation between firms is essentially a dynamic phenomenon
— if there is no dynamics, there is no way for one’s firms’ performance to influence
the viability of any other firm. Thus rather than considering firms to be independent
over a single epoch which lasts the entire period of any loan, we split the overall time
(e.g. one year) into smaller units (e.g. one month) and let the firms evolve over these
smaller time units with the default probability adjusted (since the default event in 12
monthly epochs is compounded 12 times as opposed to a single epoch). A firm may
default at any point, but will then influence its partner firms for the remainder of the
time horizon. The complexity of the theory is merely linear in time, thus it is not a
great computational burden to choose this approach.
Following the approach described in [11] it is possible to solve the model in a
stochastic manner. Credit contagion within this model is encoded at each time by a
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single number, the fraction of firms that have defaulted thus far, which evolves according
to
mt+1 = mt +
〈(
1− 〈nt(ϑ)〉
)
Φ

J0mt +
√
ρ(ϑ) η0 − ϑ√
1− ρ(ϑ) + J2mt

〉
ϑ
(12)
where 〈nt(ϑ)〉 denotes the time-dependent monthly default rate of firms with ϑi ≈ ϑ, as
influenced by interactions with the economy (see Eq (16) of [11]), and the larger angled
brackets with subscript ϑ denote an average over the bare monthly probabilities of
default for the ensemble of firms, or equivalently over the distribution p(ϑ) of their
rescaled initial wealth parameters ϑ. In (12) the Basel II recommendation which
links correlations to macro-economic factors with (unconditional) default probabilities,
ρi = ρ(pi)→ ρ(ϑi), via (4) is formally taken into account.
Note that credit contagion affects the dynamics of defaults only via two parameters,
J0 and J , which characterise the mean and variance of the impact parameter
distribution. Note also that the parameter α which quantifies forward-backward
correlation of mutual impacts according to (7) does not appear in the final formulation,
nor are there any memory-effects in the dynamics, as would normally be expected for
systems of this type. The reason for this simplifying feature is in the fact that the
defaulted state is taken to be absorbing over the risk horizon of one year.
3. Results
We now turn to presenting a few key results of our analysis. Our results concerning
default dynamics and loss distributions are obtained for an economy in which the
parameters ϑi determining unconditional monthly default probabilities pi according to
ϑi = −Φ−1(pi), are normally distributed with mean ϑ0 = 2.75, and variance σ2ϑ = 0.1
so that typical monthly bare default probabilities are in the 10−5 − 10−3 range. The
couplings to the macro-economic factor are chosen to depend on the expected default
probabilities according to the Basel II prescription (4).
In Fig. 1 we we show that renormalisation (with respect to credit contagion)
makes little difference to the typical default dynamics. The evolution of the fraction of
defaulted firms in interacting economies differs hardly from that of the non-interacting
economy with Jij = 0⇔ (J0, J) = (0, 0).
In marked contrast to this, the tails of loss-frequency and loss distributions are
strongly affected by the presence of interactions in the system, as shown in Figs. 2 and
3. We note that the tails of the loss-frequency distribution and the loss distribution
are more pronounced than in our previous study [11]. This solely due to the fact that
in the present paper we followed the Basel II suggestion that relates the coupling of a
company to macro-economic factors with its default probability via (4).
In computing the economy-wide losses per node for given macro-economic condition
η0,
L(η0) =
1
N
∑
i
ni,12ℓi (13)
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Figure 1. Typical fraction of defaulted companies as a function of time for (J0, J) =
(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (1,1) (bottom to top), realized for a neutral macro-economic
factor η0 = 0.
we assume that the ℓi are randomly sampled from the loss distribution for node i, taken
to be independent of the stochastic evolution, but correlated with the bare monthly
default probability. In the large N limit this gives
L(η0) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
n12(ϑi)ℓi =
∫
dϑp(ϑ)〈n12(ϑ)〉ℓ(ϑ) (14)
by the law of large numbers, where ℓ = ℓ(ϑ) is the mean of the loss distribution
for a node with default probability pd(ϑ). As an example we consider an economy
where average losses are inversely proportional to the unconditional default probabilities
pi = pd(ϑi) = Φ(−ϑi),
ℓ(ϑ) =
ℓ0
ε+ pd(ϑ)
(15)
with a parameter ε preventing divergence as pi → 0. In this way, the contribution
to the total losses will be approximately uniform over the bands of different default
probabilities. The distribution of the economy-wide losses per node is driven by the
distribution of the macro-economic factor, and is computed analytically as shown in
[11]. A typical result is shown in Fig. 3, for which we chose the scale ℓ0 = 1 and the
regularizer ε = 0.005. Once more economic interactions are seen to strongly affect the
tail of the loss distribution at large losses, which is due to the possibility of avalanches
of loss events in times of extreme economic stress.
Note that we have been dealing here with “synthetic” parameter distributions for
averages of loss distributions, as well as bare monthly failure probabilities. These could
be replaced by realistic ones without affecting the general set-up. We have not looked
specifically at finite size effects here. In [11] it was shown that they are fairly small.
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Figure 2. Distribution of the fraction of defaulted companies for (J0, J) = (0, 0)
(bottom) and (J0, J) = (1, 1) (top).
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Figure 3. Distribution of losses for the non-interacting system with (J0, J) = (0, 0)
(bottom) and the interacting economy with (J0, J) = (1, 1) (top).
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have looked to incorporate the risk due to credit contagion into
the internal ratings based approach discussed in BASEL II. While the mathematical
subtleties are discussed in full detail elsewhere [11], essentially the large number of
neighbours assumed for firms means that the law of large numbers and central limit
theorems apply to the interactions, meaning that our theory requires only two more
parameters than the BASEL II approach. In terms of risk, one of the striking results
is that while the effect of interactions is relatively weak in typical economic scenarios,
it is pronounced in times of large economic stress, which leads to a significant fattening
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of the tails of the portfolio loss distribution. This has implications on the fitting of loss
distributions to historical data, where care must be taken not only to fit the average
behaviour but also to take care with the more extreme events.
This touches the issue of model calibration discussed in greater detail in [13].
We note that our model requires bare default probabilities and conditional default
probabilities as inputs. Historical data, however only contain interaction-renormalised
default probabilities, and thus the problem arises of how to disentangle the two effects.
Concerning typical behaviour, Fig. 1 shows that the effect of interactions is fairly small,
and interaction-renormalised default probabilities can, to a first approximation within
this model, be taken as substitutes for the bare ones. Concerning conditional default
probabilities, these would have to be obtained from refined rating procedures; see [13].
Interestingly, however, only the low order statistics of these are needed to describe the
collective dynamics of the system. Their effect manifests itself only in situations of
economic stress, generating fat tails in portfolio loss distributions.
The model we have proposed is relatively simple in two important respects. Firstly,
we do not take into account credit quality migration but have just two states for our
firms, solvent or defaulted. The model could be extended to allow for more states for
each firm, although the full complexity of non-Markovian dynamics would resurface in
an attempt to take credit quality migration along these lines into account. Secondly,
the firms and their environment are rather homogeneous, which in practical situations is
of course an approximation. This approximation has been made for convenience rather
than out of necessity; the techniques described in [11] can be adapted so as to treat
situations with more heterogeneity in local environments. We intend to work on some
of these possible model generalisations in the future.
One advantage of our simple model is that it is exactly solvable and the solution
itself is not overly involved theoretically or computationally, and we only need to
introduce two extra parameters to quantify the effect of economic interactions —
compared to the BASEL II approach, which ignores credit contagion altogether.
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